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Abstract—In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the tra-
ditional user association based on the strongest received
signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol
can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or
heterogeneous performance. Our goal is to propose an
alternative game-theoretic approach for association. We
model the joint resource allocation and user association as
a matching game with complementarities and peer effects
consisting of selfish players solely interested in their indi-
vidual throughputs. Using recent game-theoretic results we
first show that various resource sharing protocols actually
fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource
allocation schemes. The game makes an extensive use of
the Nash bargaining and some of its related properties that
allow to control the incentives of the players. We show that
the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency
of 802.11 with heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative
impact of peer effects such as its MAC anomaly. The
mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity
management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations
without modification of the MAC layer.
Index Terms—Game theory, matching games, coalition
games, stability, control, 802.11.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IEEE 802.11 based wireless local area networks
(WLANs) have attained a huge popularity in dense areas
as public places, universities and city centers. In such
environments, devices have the possibility to use many
Access Points (APs) and usually a device selects an
AP with the highest received Radio Signal Strength
Indicator (best-RSSI association scheme). In this context,
the performance of IEEE 802.11 may be penalized by
the so called 802.11 anomaly and by an imbalance in
AP loads (congestion). Moreover, some APs may be
overloaded while others are underutilized because of the
association rule.
In this paper, we consider a fully distributed IEEE
802.11 network, in which selfish mobile users and
APs look for the associations maximizing their individ-
ual throughputs. The considered distributed association
problem with selfish users naturally motivates us to adopt
matching game theory. We thus analyze this scenario us-
ing matching games and develop a unified analysis of the
mobile user association and resource allocation problem
for the reduction of the anomaly and for load balancing
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in IEEE 802.11 WLANs. In a network characterized
by a state of nature (user locations, channel conditions,
physical data rates), composed of a set W of mobile
users and a set F of APs, the user association problem
consists in finding a mapping µ that associates every
mobile user to an AP. We call the set formed by an AP
and its associated mobile users a cell, or a coalition in the
game framework. The set of coalitions induced by µ is
called a matching or a structure (partition of the players
in coalitions). Once mobile user association has been
performed, a resource allocation scheme (also called a
sharing rule in this paper) allocates radio resources of a
cell to the associated mobile users.
This matching game is characterized by complemen-
tarities in the sense that APs have preferences over
groups of mobile users and peer effects in the sense
that mobile users care who their peers are in a cell
and thus emit preferences also over groups of mobiles
users. Indeed, by definition of DCF implementation of
the IEEE 802.11 protocol, a users’ throughput does not
only depend on its physical data rate but also on the
coalition size and composition. The following questions
are raised: are there stable associations? Do these associ-
ations always exist? Is there unicity? How to reach these
equilibria in a decentralized way? Finally, how to provide
the players the incentive to make the system converge to
another association point with interesting properties in
terms of load balancing?
In this game, some users may remain unassociated
since every AP has the incentive to associate with a
single user having the best data rate. To counter this
so called unemployment problem and control the set of
the stable matchings, we design a decentralized three
steps mechanism. In the first step, the APs share the
load. In the second step, the matching game is controlled
to provide the incentives to enforce the load balancing.
The control is based on the notion of Fear of Ruin
(FoR) introduced in [6]. In the third step, players play
the controlled matching game with individual payoffs
obtained from a Nash Bargaining (NB) sharing rule.
Under some assumptions, the NB sharing rule guarantees
that the set of stable structures is non empty in all states
of nature. A core stable matching is obtained by a decen-
tralized algorithm. We propose here a modified version
of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA), called
Backward Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (BDAA), for
matching games with complementarities and peer effects.
Similarly to the DAA, the complexity of the BDAA is
polynomial in the number of proposals.
A. Related Work
IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) anomaly is a well documented
issue in the literature, see e.g. [10], [11], [16]. Several
approaches for a single cell modify the MAC so as to
achieve a time-based fairness [10], [11] or proportional
fairness [16]. Throughput based fairness, time based
fairness and proportional fairness resource allocation
schemes are sharing rules that can be obtained from a
Nash bargaining as we will see later on.
In a multiple cell WLAN, mobile user-AP association
plays a crucial role for improving the network perfor-
mance and can be seen as a mean to mitigate the WiFi
anomaly without modifying the MAC layer. The max-
imum RSSI association approach, though very simple,
may cause an imbalanced traffic load among APs. Kumar
et al. [14] investigate the problem of maximizing the
sum of logarithms of the throughputs. Bejerano et al.
[19] formulate a mobile user-AP association problem
guaranteeing a max-min fair bandwidth allocation for
mobile user. This problem is shown to be NP-hard and
constant-factor approximation algorithms are proposed.
Arguing for ease of implementation, scalability and
robustness, several papers have proposed decentralized
heuristics to solve this issue, see e.g. [13], [22], [24].
Reference [13] proposes to enhance the basic RSSI
scheme by an estimation of the Signal to Interference
plus Noise Ratio (SINR) on both the uplink and the
downlink. Bonald et al. in [24] show how performance
strongly depends on the frequency assignment to APs
and propose to use both data rate and MAC throughput in
a combined metric to select the AP. Several papers have
approached the problem using game theory based on
individual MAC throughput. Due to the WiFi anomaly,
this is not a classical crowding game in the sense that
the mobile user achieved throughput is not necessary
a monotonically decreasing function of the number of
attached devices, as it can be the case in cellular net-
works [21], [25]. Compared to proposed decentralized
approaches, we do not intend to optimize some net-
work wide objective function, but rather to study the
equilibria resulting from selfish behaviors. Compared to
other game-theoretic approaches, we consider a fully
distributed scenario, in which APs are also players
able to accept or reject mobile users. This requires the
study of the core stability, a notion stronger than the
classical Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, there is a need
in understanding the fundamental interactions between
mobile user association and resource allocation in the
presence of complementarities and peer effects.
In this paper, we tackle the mobile user-AP associ-
ation problem using the framework of matching games
with individual selfish players. This framework provides
powerful tools for analyzing the stability of associa-
tions resulting from decentralized mechanisms. Match-
ing games [7] is a field of game theory that have proved
to be successful in explaining achievements and failures
of matching and allocation mechanisms in decentralized
markets. Gale and Shapley published one of the earliest
and probably most successful paper on the subject [3]
and solved the stable marriage and college admissions
association problem with a polynomial algorithm called
DAA.
Some very recent papers in the field of wireless net-
works have exploited the theoretical results and practical
methods of matching games [28], [29], [30], [34], [35],
although none has considered the WLAN association
problem and its related WiFi anomaly. Authors of [28]
address the problem of downlink association in wireless
small-cell networks with device context awareness. The
relationship between resource allocation and stability
is not investigated and APs are not allowed to reject
users. Hamidouche et al. in [29] tackle the problem
of video caching in small-cell networks. They propose
an algorithm that results in a many-to-many pairwise
stable matching. Preferences emitted by servers exhibit
complementarities between videos and vice versa. Never-
theless, the model doesn’t take into account peer effects
within each group. Reference [30] addresses the problem
of uplink user association in heterogeneous wireless
networks. Invoking a high complexity, complementarities
are taken into account by a transfer mechanism that
results in a Nash-stable matching, a concept weaker
than pairwise stability or core stability. References [34],
[35] study cognitive radio networks and do not exhibit
complementarities or peer effects in the definition of
players’ preferences.
B. Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a matching game-theoretic unified ap-
proach of mobile user association and resource allocation
in IEEE 802.11 WLANs in the presence of complemen-
tarities and peer effects. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first game-theoretic modeling of the IEEE
802.11 protocol covering such a number of resource
allocation mechanisms proposed in the literature.
• We use existing theoretical results to show that if the
scheduling and/or the MAC protocol result from a Nash
bargaining then there exist stable mobile user associ-
ations, whatever the user data rates or locations. This
result highlights the importance of the Nash bargaining
in wireless networks as a stability inducer.
• In order to control the matching game, we design
a three steps mechanism, which includes 1) a generic
load balancing, 2) a control step, which modifies agents’
preferences to provide them the incentive to enforce the
result of the load balancing, 3) a matching game with
resource allocation defined as a Nash bargaining and a
stable matching algorithm. The control step tackles the
so called unemployment problem, that would have left
mobile users aside from the association otherwise. We
show through numerical examples that our mechanism
achieves good performance compared to the global op-
timum solution. To the best of our knowledge, such a
mechanism is absent from both the game theoretic and
wireless networks based on matching games literature.
• We show that our BDAA can be efficiently used to
find a stable many-to-one matching in a matching game
with complementarities and peer-effects. The algorithm
has a polynomial complexity in the number of proposals.
The mechanism has been originally proposed in an
extended abstract [33]. Equal sharing has already been
assessed in [32]. BDAA has been originally proposed
in a short paper [31]. In this paper, we provide a
complete description and show the mathematical results.
We furthermore generalize the mechanism to a generic
load balancing scheme and to the Nash bargaining-based
sharing rules (resource allocation schemes). Finally, we
show new numerical results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we define the system model. In Section III, we
formulate the IEEE 802.11 WLANs resource allocation
and decentralized association problem. In Section IV,
we show that there exist stable coalition structures under
certain conditions whatever the individual data rates.
Section V presents our three steps mechanism. Sec-
tion VI shows numerical results. Section VII concludes
the paper and provides perspectives.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We summarize in Table I the notations used in this
paper. We use both game-theoretic definitions and their
networking interpretation. Throughout the paper, they are
used indifferently. Let define the set of players (nodes)
N of cardinality N as the union of the disjoint sets
of mobile users W of cardinality W and APs F of
cardinality F . As in [14], we assume an interference-
free model. It is assumed that the AP placement and
channel allocation are such that the interference between
cochannel APs can be ignored. In game-theoretic terms,
this implies that there are no externalities. The mobile
user association is a mapping µ that associates every
mobile user to an AP and every AP to a subset of mobile
users.
The IEEE 802.11 standard MAC protocol has been set
up to enable any node in N to access a common medium
in order to transmit its packets. The physical data rate
between a transmitter and a receiver depends on their
respective locations and on the channel conditions. For
each mobile user i ∈ W , let θif be the (physical) data
rate with an AP f where θif ∈ Θ = {θ1, . . . , θm},
a finite set of finite rates resulting from the finite set
of Modulation and Coding Schemes. If i is not within
the coverage of f then θif = 0. Given an association
µ, let θC = (θwf )(f,w)∈(C∩F)×(C∩W) denote the data
rate vector of mobiles users in cell C served by AP
f . Let nC be the normalized composition vector of C,
whose k-th component is the proportion of users in C
with data rate θk ∈ Θ. Note that an AP is defined
in the model as a player with the additional property
of having maximum data rate on the downlink. Within
each cell, a resource allocation scheme (e.g. induced by
the CSMA/CA MAC protocol) may be formalized as
a sharing rule over the resource to be shared in the
cell. This resource may be the total cell throughput
(as considered in the saturated regime) or the amount
of radio resources in time or frequency in the general
case. More precisely, a sharing rule is a set of functions
D = (Di,C)C∈C,i∈C , where Di,C allocates a part of the
resource of C to user i ∈ C. Equal sharing, proportional
fairness, α-fairness are examples of sharing rules.
Assuming the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol and the
saturated regime, the overall cell resource of cell C is
defined as the total throughput. It is a function of the
composition vector nC and of the cardinality |C|. We
denote ri,C the throughput obtained by user i in cell C.
From the game theoretic point of view, ri,C is understood
as i’s share of the worth of coalition C denoted v(C).
The function v : C → R is called the characteristic
function of the coalition game and maps any coalition
C ∈ C to its worth v(C). Other MAC protocols and
regime can however be modeled by this approach. For
example time-based fairness proposed in the literature to
solve the WiFi anomaly results from the sharing of the
time resource. In this case, a user i gets a proportion
αi,C of the time resource, which induces a throughout
of αi,Cθif , where f is the AP of C. It can be shown
that time-based fairness results in a proportional fairness
in throughputs.
III. MATCHING GAMES FORMULATION
A. Matching Games for Mobile User Association
In this paper, the mobile user association is modeled
as a matching game (in the class of coalition games).
The matching theory relies on the existence of individual
order relations {i}i∈N , called preferences, giving the
player’s ordinal ranking1 of alternative choices. As an
example, w1 f1 [w2, w3] f1 w4 indicates that the
AP f1 prefers to be associated to mobile user w4 to any
other mobile user, is indifferent between w2 and w3, and
prefers to be associated to mobile user w2 or w3 rather
than to be associated to w1. Following the notations of
Roth and Sotomayor in [7], let us denote P the set of
preference lists P = (Pw1 , . . . , PwW , Pf1 , . . . , PfF ).
Definition 1 (Many-to-one bi-partite matching [7]). A
matching µ is a function from the set W ∪ F into the
set of all subsets of W ∪F such that:
(i) |µ(w)| = 1 for every mobile user w ∈ W and µ(w) =
w if µ(w) 6∈ F;
(ii) |µ(f)| ≤ qf for every AP f ∈ F (µ(f) = ∅ if f isn’t
matched to any mobile user in W);
(iii) µ(w) = f if and only if w is in µ(f).
1In this paper, we use the Individually Rational Coalition Lists
(IRCLs) to represent preferences. It can indeed easily be shown that
other representations (additively separable preferences, B-preferences,
W-preferences) are not adapted to our problem, see [26] for more
details.
|set| cardinality of the set set N set of players (mobile users and APs)
W set of mobile users F set of Access Points (APs)
C set of coalitions (cells) Cf set of coalitions containing AP f ∈ F
C coalition (cell) µ matching (AP-mobile user association)
Θ set of feasible data rates θwf data rate between w and f
ri,C throughput of node (user or AP) i in cell C αi,C proportion of resources (time, frequency) of i in cell C
D sharing rule (resource allocation scheme) v(C) worth of coalition C
si,C payoff of player i in coalition C ui(.) utility function of player i
qf quota of AP f χC fear-of-ruin of coalition C
q̂f target load of AP f Ω control function
P (i) preferences list of player i over individuals P#(i) preferences list of player i over groups
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Condition (i) of the above definition means that a
mobile user can be associated to at most one AP and
that it is by convention associated to itself if it is not
associated to any AP. Condition (ii) states that an AP
f cannot be associated to more than qf mobile users.
Condition (iii) means that if a mobile user w is associated
to an AP f then the reverse is also true. In this definition,
qf ∈ N∗ is called the quota of AP f and it gives the
maximum number of mobile users the AP f can be
associated to.
From now on, we focus on many-to-one matchings.
In this setting, stability plays the role of equilibrium
solution. In this paper, we particularly have an interest
in the pairwise and core stabilities. For more details we
refer the reader to the reference book [7]. We say that a
matching µ is blocked by a player if this player prefers
to be unmatched rather than being matched by µ. We
say that it is blocked by a pair if there exists a pair of
unmatched players that prefer to be matched together.
Definition 2 (Pairwise sability [7]). A matching µ is
pairwise stable if it is not blocked by any player or any
pair of players. The set of pairwise stable matchings is
denoted S(P).
Definition 3 (Domination [7]). A matching µ′ dominates
another matching µ via a coalition C contained inW∪F
if for all mobile users w and APs f in C, (i) if f ′ =
µ′(w) then f ′ ∈ C, and if w′ ∈ µ′(f) then w′ ∈ C; and
(ii) µ′(w) w µ(w) and µ′(f) f µ(f).
Definition 4 (Weak Domination [7]). A matching µ′
weakly dominates another matching µ via a coalition
C contained in W ∪ F if for all mobile users w and
APs f in C, (i) if f ′ = µ′(w) then f ′ ∈ C, and if
w′ ∈ µ′(f) then w′ ∈ C; and (ii) µ′(w) w µ(w) and
µ′(f) f µ(f); and (iii) µ′(w) w µ(w) for some w in
C, or µ′(f) f µ(f) for some f in C.
Definition 5 (Cores of the game [7]). The core C(P)
(resp. the core defined by weak domination CW (P))
of the matching game is the set of matchings that are
not dominated (resp. weakly dominated) by any other
matching.
In the general case, the core of the game C(P)
contains CW (P). When the game does not exhibit
complementarities or peer effects, it is sufficient for
its description that the preferences are emitted over
individuals only. In the presence of complementarities or
peer effects, players in the same coalition (i.e. the set of
mobile users matched to the same AP) have an influence
on each others. In such a case, the preferences need to
be emitted over subsets of players and are denoted P#.
In the classical case of matchings with complemen-
tarities, the preference lists are of the form P =
(Pw1 , . . . , PwW , P
#
f1
, . . . , P#fF ), i.e., preferences over
groups are emitted only by the APs (see the firms and
workers problem in [7]). Moreover, it may happen that
the preferences over groups may be responsive to the
individual preferences in the sense that they are aligned
with the individual preferences in the preferences over
groups differing from at most one player. The prefer-
ences over groups may also satisfy the substitutability
property. The substitutability of the preferences of a
player rules out the possibility that this player considers
others as complements.
Definition 6 (Responsive preferences [7]). The pref-
erences relation P#(i) of player i over sets players
is responsive to the preferences P (i) over individual
players if, whenever µ′(i) = µ(i)∪{k}\{l} for l in µ(i)
and k not in µ(i), then i prefers µ′(i) to µ(i) (under
P#(i)) if and only if i prefers k to l (under P (i)).
Before defining the substitutability property of pref-
erences, we need to introduce the choice function Chi
of a player i. Given any subset C of players, Chi(S)
is called the choice set of i in S. It gives the subset of
players in C that player i most prefers.
Definition 7 (Substitutable preferences [7]). A player
i’s (i ∈ W ∪F) preferences over sets of players has the
property of substitutability if, for any set S that contains
players k and l, if k is in Chi(S) then k is in Chi(S\l).
Considering preference lists of the form P =
(Pw1 , . . . , PwW , P
#
f1
, . . . , P#fF ) and assuming either re-
sponsive or substitutable strict preferences, we have the
result that CW (P) equals S(P) [7, p.174]. Any many-
to-one matching problem with these properties has an
equivalent one-to-one matching problem, which can be
solved by considering preferences over individuals only.
The set of pairwise stable matching is non-empty.
If the preferences are neither responsive nor substi-
tutable, the equality S(P) = CW (P) does not hold in
general and the sets of pairwise, weak core and core
stable matchings may be empty. An additional difficulty
appears if the preferences over groups have to be consid-
ered on the mobile users side, i.e., if we have preference
lists of the form P = (P#w1 , . . . , P
#
wW , P
#
f1
, . . . , P#fF ).
Complementarities and peer effect may arise in both
sides of the matching. The user association problem
in IEEE 802.11 WLANs falls in this category because
the performance of any mobile user in a coalition may
depend on the other mobiles in the coalition. To break
the indifference, we use the following rule: a mobile
user prefers a coalition with AP with the lowest index
and an AP prefers coalitions in lexicographic order of
users indices.
To see that preferences may not be responsive, con-
sider an example with only uplink communications,
two APs f1 and f2 and three mobile users w1, w2, w3
such that θ11 = 300 Mbps, θ12 = θ22 = 54 Mbps,
θ21 = θ32 = 1 Mbps. Assuming saturated regime and
equal packet size, we can show that P#(w1) = f1 
f2  {w3; f1}  {w2; f2}  {w2; f1}  {w3; f2},
which is not responsive. In this example, we also see
that substitutability is not even defined since every choice
set is reduced to a singleton. After the game has been
controlled according the proposed mechanism, prefer-
ences of w1 can be modified as follows: P#(w1) =
{w3; f1}  {w2; f2}  {w2; f1}  {w3; f2} 
f1  f2. Considering S = {w2, w3; f1, f2}, we have
Chw1(S) = {w3; f1}, while Chw1(S\w3) = {w2; f2}.
Preferences are thus not substitutable.
This general many-to-one matching problem has al-
gorithmically been assessed by Echenique and Yenmen
in [17] who propose a fixed-point formulation and an
algorithm to enumerate the set of stable matchings. It
is known, that there is no guarantee that this set is non
empty if the individual preferences over groups are not of
a particular form. The problem of complementarities and
peer effects in matchings has been analytically tackled
by Pycia in [27]. Nevertheless, no result have been
derived concerning the control of core stable structures
and no matching algorithm with such reduced lists of
preferences for the mobiles have been derived.
B. Sharing Rules and Matching Game Formulation
We now assume that a player i in a given coalition C
obtains a payoff si,C , which is evaluated (or perceived)
by it through a utility function ui : R → R. In this
paper, we assume that functions ui are positive, con-
cave (thus log-concave), increasing and differentiable.
In such a case, the individual preferences are induced
by the player’s utilities of these payoffs. Note that as
utility functions are increasing, user’s preferences are
equivalently based on their payoff or their utility. We
extend our model to the framework of finite coalition
games in characteristic form Γ = (N ; v), where v is
a function mapping any coalition to its worth in R+.
By definition of the characteristic function v(∅) = 0.
In this paper we do not assume a particular form of
the characteristic function v (e.g. super-additivity2). An
even particular case of coalition games in characteristic
form concerns games with an exogenous sharing rule
Γ = (N ; v;EN ;D), where EN is the set of all payoff
vectors and D is a sharing rule.
Definition 8 (Sharing Rule). A sharing rule is a col-
lection of functions Di,C : R+ → R+, one for each
coalition C and each of its members i ∈ C, that maps
the worth v(C) of C into the share of output obtained by
player i. We denote the sharing rule given by functions
Di,C as D = (Di,C)C∈C,i∈C .
From this definition, the payoff of user i in coalition
C is given by si,C = Di,C ◦ v(C) (where ◦ is the
composition) and his utility of this payoff is given by
ui(si,C). We can now formulate the IEEE 802.11 joint
user association and resource allocation problem as a
matching game.
Definition 9 (Resource Allocation and User Association
Game). Using the above notations, the resource alloca-
tion and users association game is defined as a N -player
many-to-one matching game in characteristic form with
sharing rule D and rates θ = {θwf}(w,f)∈W×F : Γ =
(W∪F , v,R+N , D,θ). Each pair of players of the form
(w, f) ∈ W ∪ F is endowed with a rate θwf from the
rates space Θ = {θ1, . . . , θm}. For this game, we define
the set of possible coalitions C:
C = {{f}∪J, f ∈ F , J ⊆ W, |J | ≤ qf}∪{{w}, w ∈ W}.
(1)
Note that for IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol and for the
saturated regime, si,C , ri,C . For other time sharing
MAC approaches, si,C , αi,C .
IV. EXISTENCE OF CORE STABLE STRUCTURES
A. Background on Nash Bargaining
The analytical theory of bargaining has mainly been
developed on the concept introduced by J.F. Nash in [1]
and [2] for the two person game and by Harsanyi in [4]
for the N-person game. The bargaining is developed as
a cooperative game where the set of acceptable (fea-
sible) individual payoffs results from the set of mutual
agreements among the players involved. In this paper, we
use the Nash bargaining to model the resource allocation
scheme (see Section V).
Let t = (t1, . . . , tN ) be the fixed threat vector, an
exogeneous parameter that may or not result from a
threat game. The bargaining problem consists in looking
for a payoff vector (u1, ..., uN ) satisfying five axioms: (i)
Strong Efficiency, (ii) Individual Rationality, (iii) Scale
Invariance, (iv) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
and, (v) Symmetry.
We have the following result (see [15] and references
therein):
2∀C,C, v(C ∪ C′) ≥ v(C) + v(C′) if C ∩ C′ = ∅
Theorem 1. Let the utility functions ui be concave,
upper-bounded and defined on X , a convex and com-
pact subset of Rn. Let X0 be the set of payoffs s.t.
X0 = {s ∈ X|∀i, ui(si) ≥ ti} and J be the set of users
s.t., J = {j = {1, . . . , N}|∃s ∈ X, s.t. uj(sj) > tj}.
Assume that {uj}j∈J are injective. Then there exists a
unique Nash bargaining problem as well as a unique
Nash bargaining solution s that verifies uj(sj) > tj ,
j ∈ J , and is the unique solution of the problem:
max
s∈X0
∏
j∈J
(uj(sj)− tj). (2)
An important result about the Nash bargaining solu-
tion is that it achieves a generalized proportional fairness
which includes as a special case the well-known and
commonly-used proportional fairness. The proportional
fairness is achieved in the utility space with a null threat
vector. Nevertheless, if the players’ utility functions are
linear in their payoffs and the threats vector is null, the
proportional fairness is achieved in the payoff space.
In other words, the payoff vector induced by the Nash
Bargaining over the coalition throughput is proportional
fair. This makes game-theory and in particular the bar-
gaining problem of fundamental importance in networks.
In Appendix A in [36], we show that the resource
allocation induced by the MAC protocol of IEEE 802.11
can be modeled as the result of a Nash bargaining with
power functions as utilities satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 1.
B. On the Existence of Core Stable Structures
In this section, we show the existence of stable
coalition structures (users-AP association) when pref-
erences are obtained under some regularity conditions
over the set of coalitions and some assumptions over the
monotonicity of the sharing rules. There exists a stable
structure of coalitions whatever the state of nature θ if
and only if the sharing rules may be formulated as arising
from the maximization of the product of increasing,
differentiable and strictly log-concave individual utility
functions in all coalitions.
Proposition 2 ([27], Corollary 2). If the set of coalitions
C is such that qf ∈ {2, . . . ,W − 1} and F ≥ 2, and if
the sharing rule D is such that all functions Di,C are
striclty increasing, continuous and limy→+∞Di,C(y) =
+∞, then there is a stable coalition structure for each
preference profile induced by the sharing rule D iff there
exist increasing, differentiable, and strictly log-concave
functions ui : R+ → R+, i ∈ N , such that ui(0)u′i(0) = 0
and
(Di,C ◦ v(C))i∈C = argmax
sC∈BC
∏
i∈C
ui(si,C), (3)
where C ∈ C and BC = {sC = (si,C)i∈C |
∑
i∈C si,C ≤
v(C)}.
According to Proposition 2, there are two conditions
to be satisfied by the coalitions of our resource allocation
and user association game: (i) consider scenarios with at
least two APs (which is reasonable when talking about
load balancing) and (ii) every AP is supposed to be able
to serve at least two users and should not be able to serve
the whole set of users. For more details, see Appendix
B in [36].
Proposition 2 ensures that there exists a stable coali-
tion structure as soon as resource allocation results from
a Nash bargaining. The equal sharing resulting from
CSMA/CA MAC protocol in saturated regime, single-
flow per device and equal packet length is obtained by
considering si,C = ri,C and the identity function for ui.
The players’ throughputs in the general saturated regime
with multiple flows and heterogenous packet length is
obtained by taking si,C = ri,C and utility functions of
the form ui(si,C) = sαii,C , where the bargaining power
αi ∈ [0, 1] is a function of the average packet length
of user i (as shown in Appendix A in [36]). In these
examples, utility functions ui verify the conditions of
Proposition 2.
In CSMA/CA under saturated regime, the cell
throughput is increasing with the individual physical data
rates and individual throughputs ri,C are sub-additive,
i.e., decreasing with the addition of users. Assuming that
the payoff is the individual throughput, i.e., si,C = ri,C ,
then each player has the incentive to form the lowest
cardinality coalition with highest composition vector.
In this case, the unique stable structure is a one-to-
one matching, in which APs are associated to their
best mobile user. This will further be mentioned in the
name of the unemployment problem since it leaves some
mobiles users unassociated (unmatched). There is the
need for a control of the players incentives for some
equilibrium points with satisfying properties, in terms of
unemployment in the present case. In other words, since
the players have the incentive to match in a one-to-one
form, one needs to control the underlying cooperative
game so as to provide new incentives for a suitable
many-to-one form as an equilibrium.
V. MECHANISM FOR CONTROLLED MATCHING GAME
In order to tackle the unemployment problem, we
propose in this section a mechanism to control the
players incentives for coalitions (see Figure 1). This
mechanism is made of three steps. We start by consid-
ering for every AP the set of acceptable mobile users,
i.e., the mobile users with non zero data rate with this
AP. In the first step (block LB), APs share the load
defined in number of users. This results in target loads
that should be enforced by the mechanism. The second
step (blocks Ω and Φ) is a controlled coalition game
designed so as to provide the players the incentives to
form coalitions with cardinalities given by the target
loads and reducing heterogeneity (and thus reducing the
anomaly in the IEEE 802.11). The third step (block
µ) is a decentralized coalition formation (or matching)
algorithm which results in a stable structure induced by
the individual preferences influenced by the controlled
coalitional game.
LB
F
Ω
v
Φ
(ui(.))i∈N
(s∗i,C)i∈C,C∈C
µ MAC
W q̂ ṽ (u
∗
i,C)i∈C,C∈C µ (ri,C)i∈C,C∈µ
MECHANISM 802.11 MAC
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the mechanism in the most general form. The APs share the load in the block LB which gives the APs’ target
loads q̂. The characteristic function v of the original coalition game is controlled in Ω and gives the modified characteristic function ṽ. The
Nash bargaining Φ is played in each coalition for the allocation of the worth of the coalition among its members. The players then emit their
preferences over the coalitions on the basis of their shares and enter a stable matching mechanism in block µ. This block outputs an AP-user
association µ. Finally, in the block MAC the nodes transmit their packets according to the unmodified IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol.
Our mechanism can be implemented as a virtual con-
nectivity management layer on top of the IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol. Mobile users and APs form coalitions
based on the ”virtual rates” provided by this virtual
layer. Once associated, users access the channel using
the unmodified 802.11 MAC protocol.
A. Load Balancing
The first step of the mechanism is a load balancing.
This step outputs a target load vector of the form
q̂ = (q̂1, . . . , q̂F ) that defines the size of the coalitions
the players should be incentivized to form with each
AP. In other words, q̂ gives the number of connections
the players should be incentivized to create with each
AP. In numerical implementation (Section VI), users
covered by several APs are equally shared by these APs.
Nevertheless, any load balancing scheme can be used
in this mechanism. For example, there are decentralized
schemes that converge to the Nash Bargaining solution
that is known to achieve a generalized proportional fair
allocation [8], [15]. At this stage, there is no incentive
for agents to respect the target loads and if nothing else
is done the unemployment problem remains. The target
loads serve as input for the control step.
B. Controlling coalition game
The second step of the mechanism is the control of
the coalition game. The control step of the mechanism
tackles the problem of the control of the set of stable
matchings. We observed that when a coalition game is
defined by a characteristic function and a sharing rule
inducing sub-additive strictly positive individual payoffs
(except for coalitions of size one or those containing
players with zero data rates), the stable structures to be
formed are made of coalitions of size two. This step
of the mechanism develops an analytical framework and
methodology for the control of the equilibria by the way
of a control over the players’ incitations for individual
strategies.
Definition 10 (Controller). The controller is any entity
(player or other) having the legitimacy and ability to
change the definition of the game (players, payoffs,
worths, information, coalitions).
The controller may not be taking part in the game
(e.g. the network operator in a wireless network, the
government for a firms and workers association problem)
or any player of the game with some kind of additional
decisional abilities. In other words, it may be any entity
having the ability to create or modify the individual
incitations of the players for some strategy and thus
the ability to change the definition of the game. These
changes in the definition of the game in view of manipu-
lating the players’ equilibria strategies are called control
transformation,
Definition 11 (Control transformation). A control trans-
formation Ω is a mapping from the set of coalition games
in characteristic form in itself.
In the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to re-
strict the definition of the control transformations to
the domain of coalition games in characteristic form.
In fact, we further assume that the controller cannot
arbitrarily move from one game to another without
constraints. We assume that he or she can influence
the equilibria by partial changes in the definition of the
game (characteristic function, individual payoffs, ...) but
can neither change the fundamental rules of the game
(e.g. the rules of matching games) nor some essential
elements such as the players taking part in the game
or their strategy spaces. If Γ is a coalition game in
characteristic form, then Ω(Γ) is a coalition game in
characteristic form modified by the controller according
to its (constrained) abilities. The limits of the abilities of
such a controller are to be chosen by the game theorist
or the designer of the mechanism so as to satisfy the
fundamental hypothesis and description of the system he
is looking at. As an example of work on the design of
an incitations operator, Auman and Kurz [6] assess the
problem of designing the joint taxation and redistribution
scheme in the framework of a political majority-minority
game. The majority is the controller and the incitations
are induced by a multiplicative tax over the worths of
the coalitions.
In Appendix C in [36], we give two simple examples
of the mechanism we propose to control the player’s
individual incentives.
We now search for operators modifying the character-
istic function v so as to provide players the incentives
to form stable structures with coalitions of sizes q̂.
An important lever for controlling our matching game
and designing operator Ω is the fear-of-ruin (FoR).
Formally, the FoR of user i in coalition C is defined
as:
χi(si,C) ,
ui(si,C)
u
′
i(si,C)
. (4)
The FoR of coalition C is obtained as the inverse
of the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint∑
i∈C si,C ≤ v(C) at the optimum of the Nash bargain-
ing optimization problem (3). Two interesting character-
istics of the FoR are that (i) in a coalitional game with
Nash bargaining as sharing rule, the FoR is constant over
the players in a coalition, i.e., χi(si,C) = χC ∀i ∈ C
at the bargaining solution point si,C and (ii) with con-
cave increasing utility functions, the individual payoffs
increase in the common FoR [27]. Thus, the players
have the incentives to form coalitions maximizing their
FoR. In terms of control opportunities, this introduces the
FoR as a lever to control the set of individual payoff-
based incentives for coalitions. As an example, assume
two coalitions C and C ′ and their FoRs: χC < χC′ .
Players in C ∩ C ′ prefer C ′ to C. Changing the values
of the FoRs to obtain χC > χC′ changes the individual
incentives of these players so that they now prefer C to
C ′.
Proposition 3. Assume a coalition game Γ = (F ∪
W, v, {ui}i∈N ) in characteristic form with the Nash
bargaining sharing rule over v(C) for every coalition
C in C. Furthermore assume strictly increasing and
concave utility functions3 ui : R.+ → R+, i ∈ N . The
set of transformations Ω from the set of characteristic
functions in itself that provide the players the incentive
for some subset C′ of coalitions in C must satisfy:
FC′ ◦Ω(v)(C ′) < FC ◦Ω(v)(C) ∀C ′ ∈ C′,∀C ∈ C\C′
(5)
s.t. C ′ ∩ C 6= ∅ and where FC =
(∑
i∈C
(
u
′
i
ui
)−1)−1
,
where g−1 denotes the inverse function of g.
Proof. See Appendix D in [36] .
In order to derive our last result, we need to define
the concept of single-peaked preferences. Let X =
{x1, . . . , xn} denote a finite set of alternatives, with
n ≥ 3.
Definition 12 (Peak of preferences, [23]). A preference
relation  on X is a linear order on X . The peak of a
preference relation  is the alternative x∗ = peak()
such that x∗  x for all x ∈ X\{x∗}.
Definition 13 (Single-Peaked preferences, [23]). An axis
O (noted by >) is a linear order on X . Given two
alternatives xi, xj ∈ X , a preference relation  on X
3Such utility functions are bijective and thus injective. Theorem 1
applies.
whose peak is x∗, and an axis O, we say that xi and
xj are on the same side of the peak of  iff one of
the following two condition is satisfied: (i) xi > x∗ and
xj > x
∗; (ii) x∗ > xi and x∗ > xj .
A preference relation  is single-peaked with respect to
an axis O if and only if for all xi, xj ∈ X such that xi
and xj are on the same side of the peak x∗ of , one
has xi  xj if and only if xi is closer to the peak than
xj , that is, if x∗ > xi > xj or xj > xi > x∗.
We use the discrete version of this definition over N+.
We immediately obtain the following corollary, which
iteratively uses the condition of Proposition 3 to provide
players the incentive for coalitions of size q̂f with AP
f .
Corollary 1. Assume a coalition game Γ = (F ∪
W, v, {ui}i∈N ) in characteristic form with the Nash
bargaining sharing rule over the v(C) in every coalition
C ∈ C. Furthermore assume strictly increasing and
concave utility functions ui : R+ → R+, i ∈ N . The
set of transformations Ω from the set of characteristic
functions in itself that induce single-peaked preferences
(peak at q̂f ) in cardinalities over the set of coalitions
with an AP f ∈ F must satisfy:
max
C∈Cf
s.t.|C|=q
FC ◦ Ω(v)(C) < min
C∈Cf
s.t.|C|=q+1
FC ◦ Ω(v)(C),
∀q ≥ q̂f (6)
and
max
C∈Cf
s.t.|C|=q
FC ◦ Ω(v)(C) < min
C∈Cf
s.t.|C|=q−1
FC ◦ Ω(v)(C),
∀q ≤ q̂f (7)
where FC =
(∑
i∈C
(
u
′
i
ui
)−1)−1
.
Proof. See Appendix D in [36] .
Note that the control step can be centralized or de-
centralized. In a decentralized implementation, every AP
applies the control independently according to its target
load by modifying the worth of the coalitions with this
AP.
C. Access Point Association
The third step of the mechanism is the joint resource
allocation and users association (matching) game where
the players (APs and mobile users) share the resource in
the coalitions according to a Nash bargaining and then
match with each other. The coalition game played has
been described in Section III and Section IV. This step
corresponds to the blocks Φ and µ of the block diagram
in Figure 1.
1) Stable Matching Mechanism: We now show that
a modified version of the Gale and Shapley’s deferred
acceptance algorithm in its college-admission form with
Algorithm 1: Backward Deferred Acceptance
Data: For each AP: The set of acceptable (covered) users and
AP-user data rates.
For each user: The set of acceptable (covering) APs.
Result: A core stable structure S
1 begin
2 Step 1: Initialization;
3 Step 1.a: All APs and users are marked unengaged.
L(f) = L∗(f) = ∅, ∀f ;
4 Step 1.b: Every AP f computes possible coalitions
with its acceptable users, the respective users payoffs
and emits its preference list P#(f);
5 Step 1.c: Every AP f transmits to its acceptable users
the highest payoff they can achieve in coalitions
involving f ;
6 Step 1.d: Every user w emits its reduced list of
preference P ′(w);
7 Step 2 (BDAA);
8 Step 2.a, Mobiles proposals: According to P ′(w),
every unengaged user w proposes to its most preferred
acceptable AP for which it has not yet proposed. If this
AP was engaged in a coalition, all players of this
coalition are marked unengaged ;
9 Step 2.b, Lists update: Every AP f updates its list
with the set of its proposers:
L(f)←− L(f) ∪ {proposers} and L∗(f)←− L(f);
10 Step 2.c, Counter-proposals: Every AP f computes
the set of coalitions with users in the dynamic list
L∗(f) and counter-proposes to the users of their most
preferred coalition according to P#(f);
11 Step 2.d, Acceptance/Rejections: Based on these
counter-proposals and the best achievable payoffs
offered by APs in Step 1.c to which they have not yet
proposed, users accept or reject the counter-proposals;
12 Step 2.e: If all users of the most preferred
coalition accept the counter-proposal of an AP f ,
all these users and f defect from their previous
coalitions;
13 all players of these coalitions are marked
unengaged;
14 users that have accepted the counter-proposal and
f are marked engaged in this new coalition;
15 Step 2.f: Every unengaged AP f updates its
dynamic list by removing users both having
rejected the counter-proposal and being engaged to
another AP:
16 L∗(f)←− L∗(f)\{engaged rejecters};
17 Step 2.g: Go to Step 2.c while the dynamic list L∗ of
at least one AP has been strictly decreased (in the
sense of inclusion) in Step 2.f;
18 Step 2.h: Go to Step 2.a while there are unengaged
users that can propose;
19 Step 2.i: All players engaged in some coalition are
matched.
APs preferences over groups of users and users prefer-
ences over individual APs is a stable matching mech-
anism for the many-to-one matching games with com-
plementarities, peer effects considered in this paper (see
Algorithm 1: Backward Deferred Acceptance).
BDAA is similar to the DAA in many aspects. It
involves two sets of players that have to be matched.
Every player from one side has a set of unacceptable
players from the other side. In our case, an AP and a
mobile user are acceptable to each others if the user
is under the AP coverage. As in DAA, the algorithm
proceeds by proposals and corresponding acceptances or
rejections. The main difference resides in the notion of
counter-proposals, introduced to tackle the problem of
complementarities.
The block diagram representation of the algorithm
is shown in Figure (2). In block P# the APs emit
their preferences over the coalitions. In block P
′
the mobiles emit their preferences over the APs. In
block Proposals the mobiles propose to the APs. In
block counter-proposals the APs counter-propose. The
counter-proposing round continues up to convergence.
The next proposing round starts.
We enter the details of the algorithm. Having the infor-
mation of the data rates with users under their coverage,
APs are able to compute all the possible coalitions
they can form and the corresponding allocation vectors
(throughputs). They can thus build their preference lists
(Steps 1b). Then, every AP f transmits to each of its
acceptable users the maximum achievable throughput
(based on MAC layer and virtual mechanism) it can
achieve in the coalitions it can form with f (Step 1.c).
Every user w can thus build its reduced list of prefer-
ences over individual APs: w prefers fi to fj if the max-
imum achievable throughput with fi is strictly greater
than its maximum achievable throughput with fj (Step
1.d). BDAA then proceeds by rounds during which users
make proposals, AP make counter-proposals and users
accept or reject (from Step 2.a to Step 2.h). Every AP
that receives a new proposal shall reconsider the set of its
opportunities and is thus marked unengaged (Step 2.a).
L(f) is the list of all users that have proposed at least
once to AP f . L∗(f) is a dynamic list that is reinitialized
to L(f) before every AP counter-proposal (Step 2.b).
In each round of the algorithm, every unengaged user
proposes to its most preferred AP for which it has not yet
proposed (Step 2.a). Every AP receiving proposals adds
the proposing players to its cumulated list of proposers
and reinitializes its dynamic list (Step 2.b). Using P#(f)
it then searches for its most preferred coalition involving
only users from the dynamic list and emits a counter-
proposal to these users. This counter-proposal contains
the throughput every user can achieve in this coalition
(Step 2.c). Each user compares the counter-proposals it
just received with the best achievable payoffs obtained
with the APs it has not proposed to yet (Step 2.d). If one
of these best achievable payoffs is strictly greater than
the best counter-proposal, the users rejects the counter-
proposals and continues proposing (Step 2.d, Step 2.h).
Otherwise, the user accepts its most preferred counter-
proposal (Step 2.d). Given a counter-proposal, if all users
accept it, then they are engaged to the AP. All coalitions
in which these users and the AP were engaged are broken
and their players are marked unengaged (Step 2.e). If at
least one user does not agree, then the AP is unengaged
(Step 2.e), it updates its dynamic list by removing the
mobiles having rejected its counter-proposal and being
engaged to another AP (Step 2.f). The counter-proposals
continues up to the point when no AP can emit any
new counter-proposal (Step 2.g). The current round ends
and the algorithm enters a new round (Step 2.h). The
algorithm stops when no more users are rejected (Step
2.h). A stable matching is obtained (Step 2.i).
P# P
′ Proposals Counter-proposals
µ
counter-proposing loop
proposing loop
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the BDAA.
Remark: In Step 1.d, users’ reduced preferences are
optimistic preferences providing the users the incentive
to propose to new APs as long as their corresponding
best case is better than the received proposals.
Remark: We see from the above description that
there are mainly two mechanisms that allow to take
into account complementarities and peer effects. First,
information is transferred from APs to users via through-
put values and every throughput computed by an AP
takes into account the composition of the cell and so the
complementarities and peer effects between the nodes of
this coalition. Second, an AP is always able to reconsider
all possible coalitions with users having proposed to it
so far, even those that have been rejected before. This
is the main difference with DAA, where a rejected user
is never reconsidered because of the absence of group
effects.
Proposition 4. Given a many-to-one matching game,
BDAA converges, i.e., outputs a matching in a finite
number of steps.
Proof. See Appendix D in [36].
Proposition 5. Suppose the family of coalitions C as
defined in (1), and a sharing rule as defined in propo-
sition 2. Furthermore assume a tie-breaking rule such
that there is no indifference (strict preferences). BDAA
converges to the unique core stable matching.
Proof. See Appendix D in [36].
Proposition 6. The complexity of BDAA is O(n5) in
the number of proposals of the players, where n =
max(F,W ).
Proof. First we give an upper bound on the number of
proposals emitted by the mobile users, then we give
an upper bound on the number of proposals emitted
by the APs. In at most F proposals, every mobile
user has proposed to all the APs. Thus, in at most
F × W proposals, the mobile users have proposed to
all the APs. At a given round of proposals, the counter-
proposals ends at Step 2.g when no dynamic list has
been strictly decreased. These lists contains at most
W users. In the worst case, a single dynamic list is
decreased by one user, and thus after W × F rounds of
counter-proposals, all dynamic lists are empty. The round
of counter-proposals stops. At each round of counter-
proposals, F APs counter-proposes. Thus, in at most
F × W × F the APs have emitted all their counter-
proposals. We obtain that the total number of proposals
(both mobile users proposals and APs counter-proposals)
cannot exceed F 3 ×W 2. The complexity of BDAA is
O(n5) where n = max(F,W ).
In Appendix E in [36], we provide an interpretation
of BDAA in the economic framework. In Appendix F
[36], we give an example of application of the BDAA.
Remark: Note APs perform at initialization and at
every counter-proposal search and sort operations on the
set of coalitions. As the number of possible coalitions
is O(2W ) in the worst case, exponential complexity
in number of elementary operations arises in the gen-
eral case (a well known problem in coalition games).
However, with dynamic lists, an AP considers only
coalitions with users that have proposed to it so far. This
reduces the dimension of the search space in practical
implementations. Also, in the special case of WiFi, best
coalitions are obtained with maximum data rates users so
that there is no need to sort all coalitions to find the best.
In the special case of WiFi with the proposed control in
Corollary 1, coalitions of size closer to the target load
are always preferred and within a class of equal size
coalitions, those with best data rate users are preferred.
Again, the sorting of all coalitions is not required. In
the two WiFi cases, AP operations on coalitions are thus
polynomial.
Remark: User association is decentralized in the
sense that both APs and mobile users take decisions
based on their preferences. As in DAA, the association
can be performed by a central entity but it is not
necessary. The resource allocation phase is the results
of the WiFi MAC protocol, which is decentralized. In
terms of information, every AP only needs to know the
coalitions to which it can participate at initialization. In
WiFi, only users under coverage are involved so that the
needed information remains local.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulations Parameters and Scenarios
The numerical computations are performed under the
assumption of equal packet sizes and saturated queues.
Under this assumption the sharing rule is equal sharing.
Analytical expressions of the throughputs (individual and
total throughputs) are taken from [18] with the parame-
ters of Table II. We further assume that a node compliant
with a IEEE 802.11 standard (in chronological order: b,
g, n) is compliant with earliest ones. By convention, if all
nodes of a cell have the same data rate, we use the MAC
parameters of the standard whose maximum physical
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(a) Scenario 1.
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(b) Scenario 2.
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(c) A stable matching.
Fig. 3. (a) Scenario 1: A spatial distribution of APs (smallest red circles) F = {f1, . . . , f5} and devices (black points) W = {w1, . . . , w20}.
(b) Scenario 2: A spatial distribution of APs (smallest red circles) F = {f1, . . . , f5} and devices (black points) W = {w1, . . . , w10}. Circles
show the coverage areas corresponding to different data rates. (c) A stable matching in the uncontrolled case for Scenario 1.
802.11n 802.11g 802.11b
Parameter value unit
Θ {300, 54, 11} {54, 11} {11} Mbits/s
slot duration 9 9 20 µs
T0 3 5 50 slots
TC 2 10 20 slots
L 8192 8192 8192 bits
K 2 2 2
b0 16 16 16
p 2 2 2
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
data rate is the common data rate. Otherwise, we use
the MAC parameters of the standard whose maximum
physical data rate is the lowest data rate in the cell.
Assume the spatial distributions of nodes of Fig-
ures 3(a) and (b). The first scenario (a) shows the
case of 5 APs with a uniform spatial distribution of
20 mobile users. The second scenario (b) has non-
uniform distribution of 10 mobile users in the plane.
The green (inner), red (intermediate) and black (outer)
circles show the spatial region where the mobiles achieve
a data rate of 300 Mbits/s, 54 Mbits/s and 11 Mbits/s
respectively. Scenario 2 exhibits a high overlap between
AP coverages.
B. Numerical Work
1) No mechanism: We show in Figure 3(c) a stable
matching. No associated player has an incentive to
deviate and form a coalition of size superior to two. The
figure shows the natural incentives of the system in form-
ing low cardinalities coalitions with good compositions.
This can also be observed on Figure 4 which shows the
individual throughputs obtained in the coalitions. The
coalitions are sorted by cardinalities from low to high.
In plot (a) no mechanism is used. In plot (b) a gaussian
tax rate is applied. See Section VI-B2.
Figure 3(c) and Figure 4(a) show the natural incentives
of the system in forming low cardinalities coalitions with
good compositions. As a result, a one-to-one matching
is obtained. Using our mechanism, this structure of
throughputs will be changed (as in Figure 4(b)) to
move the incentives according to q̂ and thus provide the
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(a) Individual throuputs vs. coalition index.
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Fig. 4. (a) Scenario 1. Structure of the payoffs in the uncontrolled
matching game. (b) Scenario 1. Structure of the payoffs in the
controlled matching game with a multiplicative tax rate of variance
σf = 0.3, ∀f ∈ F .
players the incentives to associate according to a many-
to-one matching rather than a one-to-one.
2) Gaussian Tax Rate in Cardinalities: As an exam-
ple of family of cost functions, we can use multiplicative
symmetric unimodal cost functions. The multiplicative
cost functions are commonly called tax rates and are
defined such that for any AP f ∈ F and any coalition
C containing f , we must have:
ṽ(C) = Ω(v(C)) , cf (|C|)v(C) (8)
We particularly consider Gaussian tax rates such that:
ṽ(C) = e
−
(|C|−q̂f )
2
2σ2
f v(C) (9)
where σf is the variance of the function cf . The Gaus-
sian cost function is convenient in the sense that it does
not penalize the mean-sized coalitions and it provides a
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
 
 
mobiles
AP
(a) Stable matching resulting from Gaussian
costs and BDAA.
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(b) A global optimum association with
Gaussian costs.
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(c) A global optimum association without
costs.
Fig. 5. Controlled matching game in scenario 1. Comparison of the association obtained from (a) BDAA, (b) a global optimum for Gaussian
costs with variance σ = 0.2, (c) a global optimum without costs.
great amount of flexibility by the way of its variance.
Decreasing or increasing the variance σf indeed allows
for a strict or relaxed control of the incentives for the
target loads. Focusing on the first scenario (Figure 3 (a)),
we consider the three matchings shown in Figure 5. The
first one (a) is the stable matching resulting from the
mechanism (including BDAA and Gaussian costs); The
second matching (b) maximizes the sum of modified
throughputs (i.e. including Gaussian costs); The third
matching (c) maximizes the sum of unmodified through-
puts (i.e. without costs).
We first observe that the proposed mechanism in-
duces a stable matching with a drastic reduction of the
unemployment problem w.r.t. the result of Figure 3(c).
The natural incentives of the system resulting in a one-
to-one matching have been countered and a many-to-
one matching is obtained. The unemployment has been
reduced from 73% to 5% in this particular scenario. The
second point to be raised is that the proposed mechanism
allows to obtain (with a polynomial complexity) a stable
matching with a high modified total throughput, close to
the optimal modified total throughput that is however not
stable. For this scenario, we achieve through our mech-
anism 99% of the total modified maximum throughput
(see Figure 5(b)). This means that the cost for stability
is very small in this particular scenario. Furthermore,
the total throughput performance of the system at the
MAC layer (i.e. unmodified throughputs obtained in
block MAC of the block diagram representation of the
mechanism, see Figure 1) is 97% the total unmodified
maximum throughput (see Figure 5(b)) and 47% of the
total maximum throughput of the uncontrolled system
(see Figure 5(c)). This quantifies the cost for control,
stability and low unemployment in this scenario. The
third point is that the target loads have been enforced by
the mechanism (via the cost function) since the target
load vector is q̂ = (8.0, 4.5, 3.33, 3.83, 4.33) (obtained
by Nash bargaining4 over the share [0, 1] of the players
at the intersection of the coverages of the APs) and the
formed coalitions are of sizes 8, 4, 3, 4 and 4.
We go into more details on the difference between
the target load vector and the integer-sized coalitions in
the stable matching. Focusing on AP3 with the target
load q̂3 = 3.33, one may observe that in case of a
Gaussian cost function with unit variance, the condition
for an integer target load 3 is only satisfied for sizes
of coalitions superior or equal to 4. This meaning that
the use of a gaussian cost function centered on 3.33 and
unit variance even though increasing the penalty with the
distance in sizes to q̂f cannot guarantee the systematic
incentive to form coalitions of size 3 with AP3. There
exists some coalitions of size 2 giving the players more
individual throughputs than the worst coalition of size 3.
In such case, the players will have the incentive to form
4Achieves a proportional fair allocation in the utility space of the
APs. Induces the number of players to be connected to each AP.
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Fig. 6. (a)Unemployment rates, (b)social welfares (the social welfare of a matching is measured as the total throughput of the system at
equilibrium) and (c)computation times of BDAA over a sample of 50 scenarios obtained by spatial random uniform distribution of the mobile
devices. APs are spatially distributed as in Scenario 1. For each plot, the red line gives the empirical mean m̂ of the sample and the green
dotted lines the interval [m̂− σ, m̂+ σ] where m̂ is the empirical mean of sample and σ is the standard deviation.
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Fig. 7. (a)Unemployment rates, (b)social welfares and (c)computation times of BDAA over a sample of 50 random networks obtained by spatial
random uniform distribution of the mobile devices and APs. For each plot, the red line gives the empirical mean m̂ of the sample and the green
dotted lines the interval [m̂− σ, m̂+ σ] where m̂ is the empirical mean of sample and σ is the standard deviation.
the coalition with the highest individual value among
those of cardinalities 2 and 3. In Figure 6, we show the
performance of the mechanism over a set of 50 scenarios
generated by spatial random uniform distribution of the
mobile devices. The APs are spatially distributed as in
Scenario 1 (see Figure 7 for a random distribution of
both the mobile devices and APs). The red line shows
the empirical mean of the sample and the green dotted
lines show the interval [m̂ − σ, m̂ + σ] where m̂ is
the empirical mean of sample and σ is the standard
deviation. The empirical mean of the unemployment rate
is 6%, the mean modified social welfare is 61Mbits/s and
the mean computation time of BDAA is 0.45s. Observe
that in 22% of the realizations the unemployment is
null and that in 70% of the realizations it is below
the mean. In terms of computation times of BDAA, the
mean performance is reasonably low (0.45s to match 20
mobiles to 5 APs) and the algorithm performs even better
in 62% of the scenarios.
In Figure 7, we show the performance of the mech-
anism over a set of 50 scenarios generated by spatial
random uniform distribution of the mobile devices and
APs. The red lines show the empirical mean of the
sample and the green dotted lines show the interval
[m̂−σ, m̂+σ] where m̂ is the empirical mean of sample
and σ is the standard deviation. The empirical mean
of the unemployment rate is 8%, the mean modified
social welfare is 60Mbits/s and the mean computation
time of BDAA is 0.51s. Observe that in 22% of the
realizations the unemployment is null and that in 56%
of the realizations it is below the mean. In terms of
computation times of BDAA, the mean is higher than
in the previous case but the algorithm performs better
than the mean in 68% of the scenarios.
In Figure 8, plot (a), we show the ratios of the modi-
fied (mechanism level) social welfare (by definition, the
total throughput resulting from BDAA) to the maximum
total modified throughput. The mean performance of
BDAA achieves 96% of this maximum. Furthermore,
observe that the global maximum is achieved by BDAA
in 46% of the random networks. The ratio is below m̂−σ
in only 10% of the cases. In Figure 8, plot (b), we
show the ratios of the unmodified (MAC level) social
welfare to the unmodified total throughput induced at
the matching maximizing the total modified throughput.
The mean performance of BDAA achieves 97% of this
unmodified total throughput. Finally, observe that in
some cases, the ratio is even higher than one. This
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Fig. 8. (a)Ratios of the modified social welfares to the maximum modified (mechanism level) total throughput, (b)Ratios of the unmodified
(MAC level) social welfares to the unmodified total throughputs corresponding to the matching with maximum modified total throughput. Sample
of 50 random networks obtained by spatial random uniform distribution of the mobile devices and APs. For each plot, the red line gives the
empirical mean m̂ of the sample and the green dotted lines the interval [m̂ − σ, m̂ + σ] where m̂ is the empirical mean of sample and σ is
the standard deviation.
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(a) Stable matching resulting from Gaussian
cost and BDAA.
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(b) Matching resulting from the best-RSSI
scheme.
Fig. 9. Comparison of the association obtained from (a) BDAA and (b) the best-RSSI scheme in scenario 2. These two figures show the AP
at center (zoom).
means that BDAA gives a total throughput at the MAC
level that is superior to the (unmodified) total throughput
resulting from the maximization at the mechanism level
(modified values) while the ratio was inferior to one in
the modified case. This may come from the fact that
in some cases, the equilibrium point (stable matching
resulting from BDAA) may contain coalitions with lower
modified worths (because of the penalization) w.r.t. those
in the global maximum but higher worths at MAC level
(real unpenalized setting).
To conclude, we compare our approach to the best-
RSSI scheme in Scenario 2. The two matchings are com-
pared Figure 9. We observe that the load is effectively
shared among the APs and that the individual through-
puts are greatly increased from 527 kbits/s when using
best-RSSI to 1.64 Mbits/s for the coalition with AP1,
1.93 Mbits/s for the coalition with AP2, 2.59 Mbits/s
for the coalition with AP3, 1.64 Mbits/s for the coalition
with AP4 and 2.59 Mbits/s for the coalition with AP5.
The individual performances are multiplied by a factor
3 to 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel AP asso-
ciation mechanism in multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs.
We have formulated the problem as a coalition matching
game with complementarities and peer effects and we
have provided a new practical control mechanism that
provides nodes the incentive to form coalitions both
solving the unemployment problem and reducing the
impact of the anomaly in IEEE 802.11. Simulation
results have shown that the proposed mechanism can
provide significant gains in terms of increased through-
put by minimizing the impact of the anomaly through
the overlapping between APs. We have also proposed a
polynomial complexity algorithm for computing a stable
structure in many-to-one matching games with comple-
mentarities and peer effects. This work is a first step
in the field of controlled coalition games for achieving
core stable associations in distributed wireless networks.
Further works includes for example the study of a
dynamic number of users or the impact of interference.
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